**PLAN: The United States federal government should lift the Cuban embargo and remove the Republic of Cuba from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.**

**SOFTPOWER**

#### US influence is on the brink – multiple states and international groups are forming to counter-balance American interests. Soft Power collapses in 2015.

Suver, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2012

(Roman, “Looking back on the Cuba distraction at Cartagena and the Failure of the US Latin America Policy,” *COHA*, April 24, Online: www.coha.org/looking-back-on- the-cuba-distraction-at-cartagena-and-the-failure-of-the-u-s-latin-america-policy/)

The increasingly vocal and adamant calls for Cuba’s inclusion by Latin America, and the growing number of provocative comments being made by Latin American leaders about ending North American hegemony in the region, are ominous signs for the abiding strength of the U.S.’ influence in the region. With the prospect of the majority of the next Summit’s attendees boycotting the event under the current status quo, the future of the OAS and North American participation in Latin American affairs appears noticeably bleak. There are already a number of regional organizations which exclude the U.S. and Canada, CELAC and UNASUR among them, and their increasing relevance to international cooperation in the Americas does not bode well for North America. If the U.S. continues to persistently adhere to its current stance on Cuba **through to the 2015 Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama,** there is a distinct possibility that the OAS could lose all legitimacy as well as its influence as exasperated Latin American countries refuse to participate. This could lead to both a rethinking of U.S. policy towards Cuba, and greater cooperation and concessions by the U.S., pursuant to a more unified and egalitarian Western Hemisphere dynamic. Conversely, if the U.S. continues its archaic and neo-imperialistic stance, bodies like CELAC would stand to gain considerable influence, and could perhaps even replace the OAS as the hemisphere’s primary pan-American body and standard-bearer for regional cooperation.

**The embargo decimates U.S. soft power — it is universally opposed.**

Wilkinson 9 — Stephen Wilkinson, Chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba—an initiative by a team of UK academics, specialists and consultants, holds a Ph.D. in Cuban Literature, 2009 (“Cruel Cuban embargo must end,” *Comment is Free*—a *Guardian* blog, October 28th, Available Online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/28/cuba-embargo-un-united-nations, Accessed 05-20-2013)

The United Nations general assembly has just voted on a Cuban resolution condemning the US's trade and economic embargo against the island.

For the 18th year in succession the assembly has crushingly rejected the US policy, this time by a margin of 187-3. Only Israel (which trades with Cuba anyway) and the tiny Pacific statelet of Palau voted with the US. The vote was just as embarrassing for the superpower last year but back then it was a condemnation of an embargo enforced by George Bush. This time it is on Obama's watch, and so has a greater significance.

Prior to the vote, the secretary-general prepared a public report that explains what UN members and UN organisations say about the embargo. The document could not be more dismissive of a policy that is near-universally viewed as a hypocritical failure.

The US's closest allies oppose the policy, including the UK, Australia, France, Germany, Colombia, Japan, Mexico and Brazil. The embargo is especially unpopular in the western hemisphere, where Washington stands alone as the only government without diplomatic relations with Havana, and where organisation after organisation – the Rio Group, the Ibero-American Summit, the heads of state of Latin America and the Caribbean, and Caricom – have called for its repeal.

#### Strong relations are vital to address a wide range of impacts including economic growth, climate change, proliferation, democracy, and human rights. Relations only get worse, now is key.

Bachelet et al. 12 — Michelle Bachelet, former President of Chile, head of UN Women, and Carla A. Hills, Co-chair of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, served as United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under President Ford and as a U.S. Trade Representative under President Bush, co-chairs of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum of the Inter-American Dialogue—a non-partisan, 100-member group of politicians, academics, business leaders, and others from the United States and Latin America, et al., 2012 (“Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” Report of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum of the Inter-American Dialogue, April, Available Online at http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, Accessed 05-20-2013, p. 3-4)

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties.

Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance. For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human rights. With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership. [end page 3]

Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing. If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart. The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation. Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.

#### soft power is key to prevent every major impact including drugs and disease— power diffusion makes U.S. influence vital.

Nye 9 — Joseph S. Nye, Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor and Former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, 2009 (“American Power in the Twenty-First Century,” *Project Syndicate*, September 10th, Available Online at http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/american-power-in-the-twenty-first-century, Accessed 05-27-2013)

The United States government’s National Intelligence Council projects that American dominance will be “much diminished” by 2025, and that the one key area of continued American superiority – military power – will be less significant in the increasingly competitive world of the future. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has called the 2008 financial crisis a sign that America’s global leadership is coming to an end. The leader of Canada’s opposition Liberal Party, Michael Ignatieff, suggests that US power has passed its mid-day. How can we know if these predictions are correct?

One should beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline. Countries are not like humans with predictable life spans. For example, after Britain lost its American colonies at the end of the eighteenth century, Horace Walpole lamented Britain’s reduction to “as insignificant a country as Denmark or Sardinia.” He failed to foresee that the industrial revolution would give Britain a second century of even greater ascendency.

Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of Roman power. Even then, Rome did not succumb to another state, but suffered a death of a thousand cuts inflicted by various barbarian tribes. Indeed, for all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the US in the coming decades, the classical transition of power among great states may be less of a problem than the rise of modern barbarians – non-state actors. In an information-based world of cyber-insecurity, power diffusion may be a greater threat than power transition.

So, what will it mean to wield power in the global information age of the twenty-first century? What resources will produce power? In the sixteenth century, control of colonies and gold bullion gave Spain the edge; seventeenth-century Holland profited from trade and finance; eighteenth-century France gained from its larger population and armies; and nineteenth-century British power rested on its industrial primacy and its navy.

Conventional wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails, but in an information age it may be the state (or non-state) with the best story that wins. Today, it is far from clear how the balance of power is measured, much less how to develop successful survival strategies.

In his inaugural address in 2009, President Barack Obama stated that “our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.” Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America. We must use what has been called ‘smart power,’ the full range of tools at our disposal.” Smart power means the combination of the hard power of command and the soft power of attraction.

Power always depends on context. The child who dominates on the playground may become a laggard when the context changes to a disciplined classroom. In the middle of the twentieth century, Josef Stalin scornfully asked how many divisions the Pope had, but four decades later, the Papacy was still intact while Stalin’s empire had collapsed.

In today’s world, the distribution of power varies with the context. It is distributed in a pattern that resembles a three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, and the US is likely to remain the only superpower for some time. But on the middle chessboard, economic power has already been multi-polar for more than a decade, with the US, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players, and others gaining in importance.

The bottom chessboard is the realm of cross-border transactions that occur outside of government control. It includes diverse non-state actors, such as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets, and, at the other extreme, terrorists transferring weapons or hackers threatening cyber-security. It also includes new challenges like pandemics and climate change.

On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony, or any other cliché. Even in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the giddy pace of technological change is likely to continue to drive globalization and transnational challenges.

The problem for American power in the twenty-first century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful state. Although the US does well on military measures, there is much going on that those measures fail to capture.

Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing in a way that prevents America from achieving all its international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to Americans’ prosperity, but the US needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change, too, will affect Americans’ quality of life, but the US cannot manage the problem alone.

In a world where borders are more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, America must help build international coalitions and institutions to address shared threats and challenges. In this sense, power becomes a positive sum game.It is not enough to think in terms of power over others. One must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help to accomplish one’s own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power. The problem of American power in the twenty-first century is not one of decline, but of recognizing that even the most powerful country cannot achieve its aims without the help of others.

#### **Soft Power key to food security, piracy, global pandemics, cyber war, and natural disasters. Hard power won’t solve.**

Tufts Quoting Stavridis 13 <http://now.tufts.edu/articles/power-soft-power>

Stavradis is the former supreme commander of NATO

- See more at: <http://now.tufts.edu/articles/power-soft-power#sthash.qBAX53nN.dpuf>

He has developed those ideas into a concept he calls “open-source security,” arguing that we can protect ourselves better from today’s threats—terrorism, piracy, cyber warfare, natural disasters, global pandemics—by collaborating and sharing information than we can through secrecy and force. “We will not deliver security solely from the barrel of a gun,” he said in a recent TED talk. “My thesis of open-source security is about international, interagency, private-public connection, pulled together by this idea of strategic communication on the Internet.”

That view is far from orthodox in the U.S. military-industrial complex, which has spent trillions to build the most formidable strategic power the world has ever known. When the military has partnered with other countries or outside contractors, it has been mainly to enhance that might, all tightly controlled by a disciplined command structure.

Directly at odds with this approach, Stavridis’ concept of open-source security is more like the model of open-source software—loosening and decentralizing control to allow health organizations, business leaders, teachers and others to join in building security. And yet, through a combination of charm, conviction and military credentials, Stavridis’ unconventional worldview propelled him to the highest ranks of the armed forces. This past summer it also began to inform his latest post as the new dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy—the school from which he received both a master’s in 1983 and a Ph.D. in 1984.

Arriving on the fourth floor of Cabot Hall for a late-afternoon appointment with Stavridis, I find an office that’s run with military precision—I’m told the new dean started the day with an eight a.m. breakfast presentation to a women’s leadership group, and has been in meetings ever since. My time with him is rationed to the minute.

I enter his office, prepared to be overwhelmed by the larger-than-life figure his friends and associates have described. Instead, I find someone trim and compact, and surprisingly relaxed for a man who’s been going all day. His office is decorated with nautical memorabilia, interspersed with photos of his wife and his two daughters—one a newly minted U.S. Navy nurse—as well as his basset hound, Lilly.

Despite the time pressure, he starts the interview by asking me questions, taking a leisurely 10 minutes out of his own time to inquire about my education and upbringing. We ease into a discussion about our mutual love of old maps—Stavridis collects 17th- and 18th-century sea charts of the Atlantic—then smoothly segue into history and the role of the military in world power. The minutes seem to lengthen as Stavridis delivers his tightly packaged answers in invisible bullet points, some with invisible subpoints, before deftly wrapping up our conversation by returning the focus to me with questions about my children.

Stavridis’ gift for engaging with people from all walks of life is well known to friends and colleagues, I learn later. “He has a supreme ability to meet people where they are,” says Pete Daly, a retired vice admiral who served alongside him and has known him for 30 years. “Whether he is talking to a junior sailor or a head of state, they come away feeling like he uniquely understands their perspective.”

Mel Immergut, retired chairman of the New York law firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy and a senior defense advisor, toured operations in Afghanistan with Stavridis and remembers watching him speak with everyone from brigadier generals to a soldier in a forward operating base on the Pakistan border that was under heavy fire. “Not everybody can interact with a 17-year-old from Council Bluffs, Iowa, in a mess hall and get him to open up,” Immergut says. “He spoke to him about the quarters he lived in, the food he ate, as well as the dangers they faced.”

But his ability to connect is only one of many strengths. Immergut, who is a trustee of the Intrepid Sea, Air & Space Museum, in New York City, presented Stavridis with the Intrepid Freedom Award in 2011. During the ceremony, he called Stavridis a “Renaissance admiral,” a name that has stuck with him after it was taken up by the New York Times to describe him.

“I’ve had a chance to see him in so many capacities—as a warrior, author, speaker, leader, family man, the whole gamut of what you would want for someone in the positions Jim has filled,” Immergut says. “He is the embodiment of all of those qualities. It’s the rare person who can truly be said to fit that description.”

Born in south Florida, Stavridis went to the U.S. Naval Academy to follow in the footsteps of his Greek-American father, a Marine. While on training cruises, he fell in love with the sea and decided to enlist in the Navy instead. Even at Annapolis, he showed a broad intellectualism, majoring in English literature before graduating in 1976.

But the first time Stavridis began to consider ideas of “soft power” was when he entered the Fletcher School in 1981 as a graduate student. “Up to that point, I had been entirely focused on learning my profession, going to sea, driving ships, becoming a good Navy officer,” he says. “When I came to the Fletcher School, I began to learn about the world”—through classes in developmental economics, international business and diplomatic history. He came to understand not just how wars are fought, but how they start and how to avoid them.

More than the class work, though, he says it was his fellow students who opened his eyes to the complexities of the world and the privileged place the United States held in it. He listened to the stories his Latin American and Caribbean classmates told about the clumsy way the United States sometimes threw its weight around in the region. “I began to see that military force in and of itself—hard power—seldom yields the results you are seeking,” he says.

Unlike most of the students from the Navy, who gravitated towards the national security program, Stavridis sought out Jerry Cohen, a professor of political economy, to guide his dissertation on treaty negotiations over the law of the sea. “He has a natural interest in just about everything,” says Cohen, now chair of the political science department at the University of California, Santa Barbara. “He doesn’t exclude anything.”

Cohen remembers mentioning offhandedly that he was reading The Natural, Bernard Malamud’s mystical baseball novel, and Stavridis pointing out the many ways in which the book was based on the Arthurian quest for the Holy Grail. While at Fletcher, Stavridis took time to teach a course on the literature of the sea at the Tufts Experimental College and to spar with Cohen on the tennis court. “He was far better than me—he insisted on giving me a few lessons,” Cohen laughs.

After graduating from Fletcher in 1984, Stavridis soared through the naval ranks, excelling at ship handling in a way that earned the attention of his superiors. “It’s unusual to get widely known as a junior officer—unless you’d done something bad,” says Daly, the retired admiral who served with Stavridis. “Jim was widely known even as a lieutenant.” Besides driving ships himself, he wrote articles on tactics and maneuvers, eventually serving on the board of the U.S. Naval Institute, which publishes a monthly journal of musing, opinions and criticisms of the service.

From 1993 to 1995 he commanded a destroyer, the USS Barry, which he captained in the Persian Gulf following the Gulf War and in the Adriatic supporting UN peacekeepers in the Bosnian War.

It was during that time that he first realized how much good the military could do. The United States was trying to help return Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti when his ship took part in humanitarian operations there. “I saw firsthand the grinding poverty of Haiti, and how well received the shipment of U.S. aid, loaded on the pier by Navy sailors, was—far more so than weapons and security,” he says.

It was a lesson he remembered as he rose to command his own destroyer squadron—six warships—in 1998, and then the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, with its dozen vessels, in 2002 during the Iraq War. By the time he was appointed head of U.S. Southern Command in 2006, he was ready to put his ideas into practice on a wider scale.

Evelyn Farkas, F95, F99, met Stavridis when she was a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which oversaw his command (she’s now deputy assistant secretary of defense). She watched as he created more positions that served as liaison with the State Department and other agencies and as he channeled military resources toward things like medical aid and clean water development. He wanted his senior officers to study native languages, and led the way by learning French, Spanish and Portuguese.

“His philosophy when he met with State Department officials was that his military officials were there to support diplomatic efforts,” says Farkas. “Most military commanders have very little understanding of that. He is the first one I saw articulating that message.”

One of Stavridis’ prime goals was to encourage companies and nonprofits to work with the military in areas beyond supporting combat operations. For a project called Continuing Promise, he helped set up a partnership between the U.S. Navy and such nonprofits as Operation Smile, Project HOPE and Rotary to provide construction services and medical care. In another case, he enlisted business executives as volunteers to study the inner workings of drug cartels and recommend ways to thwart their business and financial networks.

In part, it was such innovation that caused the Obama Administration to tap Stavridis for the job of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, one of NATO’s top two military posts, in 2009. Before him, no Navy commander had ever held the position—a particularly relevant fact at the time, given NATO’s focus on landlocked Afghanistan. The surprise pick raised eyebrows, though military observers quickly praised the choice by pointing to the admiral’s skills as a commander.

After Stavridis’ appointment, Farkas, then a NATO official, worked with him to set up public-private partnerships in Europe as well. For example, computer executives were recruited to help one of the Baltic countries set up a defense for its cyber vulnerabilities.

“The work they did pro bono,” Farkas says, “was something that even our wealthy allies would have trouble affording if we put a price tag on it, and the whole thing was done in a number of weeks.”

Such partnerships are controversial in the Defense Department. While they can help cut costs and take advantage of skills the military doesn’t have, they can upset military hierarchies and open the government up to charges of conflict of interest. Stavridis and Farkas navigated these treacherous waters by putting buffers such as an independent search committee between Defense and private enterprise to make sure that choices were based on merit and not special interests.

As head of NATO’s military strategy, Stavridis was instrumental in the drawdown of American troops in Afghanistan and the transition to Afghan forces under Obama. At the same time, he helped put soft power to the test in the part of the world marked by the most anti-American sentiment, starting programs such as a countrywide effort to teach more than 200,000 members of the Afghan coalition forces to read.

He has run into his share of skeptics for diverting resources into such programs—both privately within the military and in the punditry at large. A Pew Research Center study of humanitarian efforts, for example, pointed to opinion polls showing they made only a small dent in anti-U.S. attitudes. “The impact of humanitarian assistance should not be overstated,” it said, referring to efforts in Pakistan and Indonesia. “Solid majorities in both countries continue to have a negative impression of the U.S.”

But Stavridis remains unapologetic. “Teaching young Afghan soldiers to read is extremely in the wheelhouse of American security,” he says. “It opens a different world for young Afghans. It gives them real tools and skills. It differentiates us from the Taliban. It encourages them to participate in the political process.”

He calls such initiatives “building bridges,” in contrast to “building walls,” the strategy that has prevailed through most of the history of American security efforts. “Look back at the 20th century when we built walls and killed people to protect ourselves,” he says. “Well, how’d that work out? Sixty million dead in two world wars, a cold war that almost destroyed the planet. Frankly, that didn’t seem to be a particularly effective way of generating security.”

Among the bridges Stavridis talks about are social media, which he himself uses with gusto. He was known in the military for being unusually accessible by email, and one of his first actions at Fletcher was to set up a new blog, complete with a video introducing himself to the school. He has 15,000 followers on Twitter, where his recent tweets range from opinions on intervention in Syria to boasts about the incoming Fletcher student body and reports of a recent lunch with the prime minister of Greece.

What excites him most about social media is their potential to “change the arc of history,” as Facebook and Twitter did during the Arab Spring. “Social networks flatten hierarchies and undermine authoritarian regimes because they allow people to exchange information freely,” he says—and not just information about their own society but about any place on earth. “They can look at another’s life using a social network and see that a world of liberty and democracy and education and gender equality exists and is working, and they want that too,” he says.

Social media are a marketplace of ideas, and Stavridis thinks the United States should do more to compete in it. “We have a pretty good narrative: democracy, equality and human value—essentially the values of the Enlightenment. But in order to move our message, we need to be in that space. The lead should be at the State Department, but every level of the U.S. government has a role to play.”

Of course, the growing importance of digital networks presents threats as well as opportunities. Cyber security could become a critical strategic issue in the coming decades—so much so that in a recent Foreign Policy article, Stavridis argued for the creation of a new branch of the military, a U.S. Cyber Force, which would wage both offensive and defensive cyber operations. He compares the emergence of cyber attacks to the invention of airplanes, which eventually led to the need for an air force.

“We are on the beach at Kitty Hawk in cyber, and it is evident that there will be a military component,” he says. Already, countries have used cyber attacks to steal and destroy data, he says. We must not only learn how to defend against such attacks, but be prepared to launch them ourselves.

Two other trends will transform the military in the next 20 years, he says: the increased use of special forces for small-scale surgical strikes, such as the attack that took out Osama bin Laden, and a growing reliance on unmanned vehicles, better known as drones. “We’ll also have unmanned surface vehicles, we’ll have unmanned vessels operating at sea on the surface, and we’ll have vehicles operating at depth in the ocean,” he says. The value of drones, he argues, is threefold—they allow the military to avoid putting humans at risk, they are cheaper to operate, and they can perform in harsher conditions.

Asked about the more controversial aspects of drones, such as highly publicized civilian casualties from drone strikes, he defends their use, saying that the more precise targeting technology of drones actually reduces so-called collateral damage, a benefit that will only increase as technology improves.

“Many of the same arguments were made with submarines—that they were illegal, that they were surreptitious and operated without warning and sunk innocent ships,” he says. “Yet over time, we’ve become very comfortable with submarines as part of military operations, and I think it’s going to be the same with airborne drones.” He adds that drones are widely used for humanitarian operations, such as monitoring disaster relief sites, aiding agricultural development and dropping food and medical supplies in hard-to-reach areas. “That’s part of the message we need to express more clearly.”

In all of these areas, Stavridis’ forward-looking ideas have revised the traditional conception of the military. His friends and colleagues don’t doubt he’ll bring equally innovative ideas to the realm of international relations as Fletcher’s new dean. “First of all he knows the school,” says his former advisor, Jerry Cohen. “But beyond that he is a man of real vision. He is thinking of what’s over the horizon, not just what’s happening now.”

In his inaugural blog for Fletcher, Stavidis included a list of emerging issues in international relations that would hardly be on the lips of mainstream analysts—including the Arctic, biosciences and environmental challenges. “I think we’re passing out the age of information,” he says by way of explanation. “The next radical set of changes will come through biology.” He points to examples such as food and crop security, response to pandemic, genetic manipulation and increased human performance. He adds that it’s an area Fletcher is uniquely suited to address in collaboration with Tufts’ “constellation” of life science schools.

#### Future pandemics threaten human survival

**Carpenter and Bishop 2009** (P. A., P. C., July 10, Graduate Program in Studies of the Future, School of Human Sciences and Humanities, University of Houston-Clear Lake, Houston, TX, USA, Graduate Program in Futures Studies, College of Technology, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA. A review of previous mass extinctions and historic catastrophic events, ScienceDirect)

The flu of 1890, 1918–1919 Spanish flu, 1957 Asian flu, 1968 Hong Kong flu, and 1977 Russian flu all led to mass deaths. Pandemics such as these remain major threats to human health that could lead to extremely high death rates. The 1918 pandemic is believed to have killed 50 million people [27]. AIDS (HIV) has killed an estimated 23 million people from 1978 to 2001 [15]. And there have been numerous other incidents of diseases such as cholera, dysentery, influenza, scurvy, smallpox, typhus, and plague that have caused the deaths of many millions throughout history. Clearly, these biological diseases are much greater threats to human survival than other natural or environmental disasters. Because bacterium and viral strains experience antigenic shifts (which are small changes in the virus that happen continually over time, eventually producing new virus strains that might not be recognized by the body’s immune system), another devastating pandemic could appear at any time. It should also be noted that the threat from biological weapons is quite real. In fact, scientists from the former Soviet Union’s bioweapons program claim to have developed an antibiotic-resistant strain of the plague [26].

#### Agricultural instability leads to either mass starvation of a multitude of wars—untold death results

**Ikerd ‘02** Professor Emeritus, University of Missouri (John, “Small Farms: The Foundation for Long-Run Food Security” Presented at “A Time to Act: Providing Educators with Resources to Address Small Farm Issues,” sponsored by University of Illinois, Agroecology/Sustainable Agriculture Program <http://web.missouri.edu/ikerdj/papers/IllSmall.html>//JC)

But **in times of crisis, a nation that can’t feed itself is no more secure than is a nation that can’t defend itself.** Perhaps we won’t abandon agriculture completely, but we could easily become as dependent on the rest of the world for our food as we are today for our oil. Perhaps, we can keep our food imports flowing, as we do for oil, but how large a military force will it take, **how many “small wars” will we have to fight, and how many people will be killed.**

**Cybersecurity threats will cause accidental launch that triggers the Dead Hand and nuclear war**

**Fritz 9** (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)  
*Direct control of launch*

The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ \*\*[they cut off the paragraph]\*\* “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

#### Climate Change causes Extinction

Tickell 08 – (Oliver Tickell is an environmental Researcher. He is the founder of the Kyoto2 climate initiative, a researcher of the Oxford Climate Associates and specialized in international climate policy. Published August 11th, 2008 (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange>)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson [PhD in Chemistry, Award for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility from the American Association for the Advacement of Science] told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean**,** in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King [Director of the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment at the University of Oxford], who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

#### Natural Disasters are seven times more dangerous than war.

Terradaily citing WMO ‘2

<http://www.spacedaily.com/news/earth-02j.html>

WMO- World Meteorological Organization

Global statistics continue to highlight an increasing number of people who are affected by weather- and climate- related disasters while records show a corresponding increase in the number of such hazards, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on the occasion of Friday's World Meteorological Day.

"This worrying trend is counterproductive to a sustainable way of life for all world populations", says WMO Secretary General Prof. Godwin O. P. Obasi.

Natural disasters claim globally nearly 250,000 lives every year and for example over the decade 1991-2000, more than 90 percent were killed by weather- and climate-related disasters. Over the period, the events affected more than 200 million persons per year, which is seven times the number of persons affected by armed conflict.

The global annual costs for property damage lay between 50 to 100 billion US dollars. Asia has been the continent most frequently hit by hydro- meteorological disasters, accounting for 43 per cent of the total number of events and 80 per cent of the people killed during last decade.

With the theme for World Meteorological Day 2002, "Reducing vulnerability to weather and climate extremes", WMO wishes to draw special attention to the devastating impact of weather- and climate- related disasters, the increased vulnerability of humankind and the need for better response mechanisms; assessments of such vulnerability depend on the availability of climate data.

Prof. Obasi: "In the onger term, sustainable development will be determined to a large extent by projected climate change and its impact on sea-level rise, agriculture and water resources and associated natural disasters.

It is projected, for example, that climate change will lead to an intensification of the water cycle, causing increased droughts in some places and floods in others."

While well-established communities have built up their infrastructures and prospered within a general pattern of local climate to which they have adapted, extreme events with intensities outside this range can cause catastrophic failure in environmental, economic and social terms.

Severe thunderstorms with related phenomena such as tornadoes, lightning, hailstorms, strong winds, dust- and sandstorms, waterspouts and downpours can be short-lived but extremely violent.

Other phenomena and associated events that are responsible for loss of life and property damage include tropical and mid-latitude cyclones, monsoons, heat waves, cold spells, blizzards and El Nino/La Nina.

The consensus among meteorologists that the odds of a new El Nino event occurring this year are higher than they have been since the El Nino of 1997/98, is broadly based upon increasingly accurate seasonal predictions which are prerequisite for preparations and effective action in good time.

There is some evidence that the signal of El Nino events can be seen in the rainfall and temperature records across southern Europe or the reported recent flooding in Ecuador and Peru, but there are no data yet allowing the formulation of views on the likely intensity of an El Nino, should one develop.

"We are very aware of the fact that we do not automatically benefit by progress in science. It depends on how we use the resulting knowledge and tools", adds Prof. Obasi.

"Through WMO, there is a global availability of real- and near-real-time weather and climate information, which is essential for vulnerability assessment, developing natural disaster reduction strategies and early warnings.

WMO's commitment is to translate all of these advances in sciences and technology into useful products for the safety and well being of society."

#### Drug trafficking turns stability – makes suppressing violence impossible

**Kleiman, 4**

(Mark, B.A. magna cum laude, Haverford College, M.P.P., Harvard Kennedy School, Ph.D., Harvard, Professor of Public Policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, “Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and Implications for Domestic Drug Control Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/20/2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32334.pdf, JKahn)

Drug dealing can generate chaos and instability in source and transit countries by sustaining violence, both within and among groups of traffickers and between traffickers on the one hand and ordinary citizens and public authorities on the other. The growth of a criminal economy is also a potentially destabilizing factor. Drug law enforcement can create friction between law enforcement and military authorities on the one hand and ordinary citizens, including small farmers who illicitly grow drug crops, on the other. The secretive techniques of drug investigation can become entangled with the practice of authoritarian rule, as appears to have happened under the Fujimori16 government in Peru. In addition, traffickers can deliberately create chaos in order to weaken the ability of the institutions of government and civil society to interfere with their illegal business. In Colombia, for example, the Medellin Cartel attempted to use terror to deter the Colombian government from proceeding with vigorous law enforcement measures.17 The same effects can also take place in consumer countries. The retail drug traffic, especially when it grows violent, can be a powerful source of chaos, as many American neighborhoods discovered as the crack trade spread in the 1980s and early 1990s. It has been suggested, though not demonstrated, that drug trafficking has been used as a form of low-intensity conflict.18 The theory is that forces hostile to a given country might attempt to introduce or aggravate drug addiction problems there as a means of attack.

#### Engagement with Cuba boosts overall U.S. *soft power* — the plan increases momentum and credibility.

Dickerson 10 — Sergio M. Dickerson, Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army, 2010 (“United States Security Strategy Towards Cuba,” Strategy Research Project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the U.S. Army War College, January 14th, Available Online at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518053, Accessed 05-20-2013, p. 21-22)

Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and [end page 21] eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come

#### TERRORISM

#### First, enforcing the embargo diverts attention and resources from urgent counter-terrorism priorities.

Johnson et al. 10 — Andy Johnson, Director of the National Security Program at Third Way—a public policy think tank, former Staff Director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, et al., with Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor in the National Security Program at Third Way, and Kristina Lilac, Policy Advisor in the National Security Program at Third Way, 2010 (“End the Embargo of Cuba,” Memorandum issued by Third Way—a public policy think tank, September 16th, Available Online at http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third\_Way\_Memo\_-\_End\_the\_Embargo\_of\_Cuba.pdf, Accessed 07-20-2013)

Keeping the embargo in place requires that the US government devote time and resources to fighting a Cold War-era threat. Senator Chris Dodd argued in a 2005 oped that the US spends “extraordinary resources” each year to enforce the sanctions instead of devoting such resources to the fight against terrorism.4 While the financial resources dedicated to enforcing the embargo may be limited compared to resources dedicated to other causes, lifting the Cuban embargo could put the US in a better position to fight terrorist organizations by freeing up resources currently enforcing the embargo.

For example, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which governs travel and trade between the US and Cuba, is also responsible for maintaining sanctions against truly problematic countries, including Iran and North Korea. OFAC also is responsible for responding to economic threats posed by terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers. By ending OFAC’s need to regulate the Cuban embargo, OFAC could instead devote those resources to respond to the current threats posed by rogue states and terrorist networks.

#### Second, Cuba’s inclusion on the Terror List *independently* undermines U.S. anti-terrorism credibility.

Kayyem 13 — Juliette Kayyem, Lecturer in Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on International Policy, Columnist for the *Boston Globe*, former Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs in the United States Department of Homeland Security, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2013 (“Diluting the terror watch lists,” *Boston Globe*, April 29th, Available Online at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/04/28/making-terror-lists-matter-cuba-not-state-sponsor-terrorism/X2NW0rfYm5A2eJT5VZEuHI/story.html, Accessed 05-14-2013)

This week, another terrorism watch list will be announced, known as the state sponsors of terrorism list. It is a formal designation that began in December 1979 and serves as the State Department’s ranking of countries that “repeatedly provide . . . support for acts of international terrorism.” Nations currently on the list include Iran, Sudan, and Syria. It also includes Cuba. Whatever historical complaints or ideological rifts the United States may have with its close neighbor, Cuba should be off the state sponsor list. It is time to take our terror designations seriously.

The state sponsor list is not just name-calling, though there is an element of shaming in the public condemnation. Countries are subject to strict sanctions, including a ban on arms-related sales, controls over commercial exports, and prohibitions of economic assistance.

Cuba seems to be on the list because, as previous State Department assessments have determined, it supports revolutionary movements in Latin America and gives direct support in terms of training and arms to “guerrilla groups” and, note the turn of phrase here, their “terrorist operations.” Cuba’s support includes safe haven to members of Columbia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces, known as FARC, which has waged an insurgency there but is now engaged in peace negotiations.

None of this has to do with the United States and its direct safety and security. Sure, the FARC and other guerrilla groups have destabilized the region, but that has nothing to do with terrorist threats to the United States.

The state sponsor list is no longer about terrorism. Pakistan, for example, is not on it. Domestic politics, not terror, explain Cuba’s status as our neighborly pariah. The continuing isolation of Cuba is inexplicable in modern times.

It is no longer legitimate to simply claim that the electoral map — with a powerful anti-Castro lobby based in Florida — is a sufficient explanation, as if only the politically naive would think otherwise. Even if such blatantly political justifications were valid, the Cuban-American community is actually quite divided about overtures to a nation whose progress and fiscal security can benefit the entire region.

The Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender reported this year that Secretary of State John Kerry was reviewing the policy, hoping to thaw relations with Cuba and make the terrorist state sponsor list be about terrorism. It’s not clear if Kerry’s views will prevail.

#### FIRST SCENARIO

#### Russian growth unsustainable- decline inevitable

**Goldstone, 12-2-11,** Jack A., Hazel professor of public policy at George Mason University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He blogs on global trends at NewPopulationBomb. “Rise of the TIMBIs,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/02/rise_of_the_timbis?page=full>

Compared with much-hyped China, Russia's problems are well known. Its population is declining, and its health-care system is a disaster -- indeed the U.N. demographics division projects Russia's 15-59 age population to fall by one-fifth in the next three decades. With that projected labor-force decline, for Russia to sustain 5 percent annual economic growth would require that productivity per worker increase by almost 6 percent per year -- as opposed to the 2007 level of productivity growth, which was 1 percent. Russia's other drivers of growth also show considerable weakness. First, it is not a diversified economy. Although it is a leader in global arms exports and is making progress in software, its other products are not internationally competitive. Fully 25 percent of Russia's GDP comes from oil and gas revenues. The slowdown in global oil and gas consumption in 2008 and 2009 had a disastrous impact on the Russian economy, and worse consequences were only averted by Russia's wise provision of a stabilization fund accumulated between 2004 and 2007. Even Russia's oil output has been stagnant in recent years. Perhaps most worrisomely, Russia's dominant position in the European market for natural gas is now projected to have competition from large domestic reserves of shale gas found in Western Europe. Russia already has a well-educated labor force; improvements in productivity will have to come mainly from new technology and effective capital investments. Both, however, are lacking in Russia today. The IBM report on use of business technologies placed Russia as 59th out of 70 countries in e-business development, and 98th out of 134 countries in the use of the latest technologies by its companies -- again, like China, well below India and Brazil. Moreover, the lack of legal protections and a transparent justice system is an impediment to increased productivity down the line. Attracting foreign capital, and the efforts of domestic innovators and entrepreneurs, will require that investors be able to control their corporations and their profits, and operate under a state-enforced rule of law. Russia, however, is drifting toward a condition of endemic corruption and state predation. The recent trial and resentencing of former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky will likely reinforce the belief that Russia is not a nation of laws. This development is fatal for generating innovative entrepreneurship. Russia's government and economy will likely be kept afloat as long as oil and gas prices remain high. Yet that merely will turn Russia into Saudi Arabia with snow, not a center for future economic growth.

#### With a weakened Russian economy, Russia will sell nukes to terrorists and a nuclear war is inevitable in the status quo

Patrick F. Speice, 2006 (staff, William and Mary Law Review), February 1, 2006. Retrieved Apr. 22, 2013 from Lexis.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

#### SECOND SCENARIO

#### Iran-sponsored terrorism is an urgent threat — large-scale attacks against Israel and the U.S. are likely.

Jenkins 12 — Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the President of the RAND Corporation, formerly served as chair of the Political Science Department at RAND, former member of the National Commission on Terrorism, holds an M.A. in History from the University of California-Los Angeles, 2012 (“An Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat: A Resurgence of Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism,” RAND Corporation — Excerpt from Congressional Testimony, July 23rd, Available Online at http://www.rand.org/blog/2012/07/an-assessment-of-the-current-terrorist-threat-a-resurgence.html, Accessed 07-20-2013)

Jihadists are not the only terrorist concern. Growing tensions with Iran could result in an escalation of Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks on American targets abroad or in the United States, as recent events attest. In February 2012, Iranian operatives were linked to terrorist plots or attempts targeting Israeli diplomats in India, Georgia, and Thailand.

In March, authorities in Azerbaijan arrested 22 Azerbaijani citizens who had been hired and trained by Iran to carry out terrorist attacks on the American and Israeli embassies, as well as Western companies. This was third set of arrests of Iranian-trained agents in Azerbaijan since the beginning of the year.

In July, Kenyan authorities reportedly uncovered another Iranian plot to attack Israeli, British, American, or Saudi targets—Iran's principal foes—in Mombasa.

Finally, in October 2011, U.S. authorities uncovered an Iranian plot to assassinate the ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Washington. Killing a Saudi diplomat on American soil in an attack that could also have killed American citizens would have enormous consequences.

The United States must recalibrate Tehran's willingness to take risks.

Several factors may explain this apparent recklessness. Radical elements may have acquired greater influence among Iran's ruling clerics.

Iran may feel obliged to retaliate for what it sees as Israeli and American efforts to slow its nuclear program, not only through sanctions but also through sabotage of its facilities and assassinations of its nuclear scientists. To the extent that Iran's leaders perceive these efforts as a campaign aimed not just at preventing the country from developing nuclear weapons but, rather, at bringing down the Islamic Republic, they may reckon that they have little to lose.

The future threat posed by Iranian-sponsored terrorism will be contingent upon Iran's calculations of risk. The current shadow war could escalate further if Iran thinks military attack by either Israel or the United States is inevitable and imminent or, obviously, if hostilities begin.

Under such circumstances, Iran could launch attacks on U.S. military and civilian targets in the region, including oil facilities and shipping. It could also attempt to carry out a strategic strike (a 9/11-scale attack) or something greater on U.S. soil. And it could rely on its own operatives, try to activate Hezbollah's international networks, or conceivably assist other groups, including al Qaeda, to escalate their terrorist campaigns.

Hezbollah has criminal networks in the United States, primarily engaged in fraud and smuggling, which remit a portion of their proceeds to the organization and possibly could be converted into terrorist cells.

#### These attacks will be effective and use weapons of mass destruction.

Walker and Golestani 9 — Justin Walker, Intelligence Analyst at the Urban Warfare Analysis Center, and Leila Golestani, Intelligence Analyst at the Urban Warfare Analysis Center, 2009 (“Threat Analysis: Hamas and Hezbollah Sleeper Cells in the United States,” Report Prepared by the Urban Warfare Analysis Center, March 18th, Available Online at http://www.scribd.com/doc/76745623/Threat-Analysis-Hamas-and-Hezbollah-Sleeper-Cells-in-the-United-States-Urban-Warfare-Analysis-Center, Accessed 07-20-2013, p. 19)

The Threat of Innovative Attacks

An innovative attack is one that deviates from an organization’s past behavior. Hezbollah has established itself as a creative, innovative force in modern terrorism and irregular warfare. If Hezbollah was to attack the U.S. homeland, it is likely it would act based on a well-conceived plan that meets its strategic goals. It is unlikely that Hezbollah would perform an attack in America without a strong probability of success; a surprise attack fits that agenda.

• Likewise, Hezbollah poses the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because of its Iranian connection. Hamas is also linked to Iran, but that relationship is not as deeply-rooted as Hezbollah-Iran ties. Iran would likely trust Hezbollah to perform a WMD attack over Hamas.

#### THIRD SCENARIO

#### North Korea terrorist risk is high. If North Korea successfully sponsored terrorists, the US would surely retaliate.

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| Millen, LTC Raymond, Director of Regional Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute**;** (2005) "Welcome Iran and North Korea to the Nuclear Club: You’re Targeted." *Strategic Studies Institute* 1. |

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub678.pdf>

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But is directed nuclear deterrence unnecessarily provocative? The response is ¶ simply that the past conduct of both Iran and North Korea counts, which is why they ¶ are singled out from the rest of the nuclear club. Both have clashed with the United ¶ States in the past and actively foment anti-American behavior. They are adversaries of ¶ the United States and should be treated as such. If they do not wish to be targeted, then ¶ they can give up their nuclear weapon ambitions. ¶ The pressing fear is of Iran or North Korea providing nuclear devices to terrorist ¶ proxies to attack the United States. The United States must make clear that it views ¶ terrorist organizations as merely another delivery device, no different from a nuclear ¶ bomb delivered by an aircraft or ballistic missile. Should a terrorist organization ¶ detonate a nuclear device or dirty bomb in the United States or allies, a nuclear ¶ retaliation for both will be assured. Admittedly, such a nuclear retaliation against Iran ¶ and North Korea seems rash because their involvement will not likely be ascertained. ¶ Philosophers can debate the ethics of nuclear retaliation resulting from a nonattributive ¶ nuclear attack all they want, but Iran and North Korea must face the hard consequences ¶ of their reckless behavior. Under such conditions, they have strong incentives to ¶ practice nonproliferation as well as quietly informing the United States of any terrorist ¶ plots to use nuclear devices.

#### North Korea proliferation and U.S. retaliation would cause extinction

**Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10** – \*Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND \*\* Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection.

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community.

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.

But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view:

That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4

These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

#### nuclear terrorism is an existential threat — don’t underestimate the probability.

Saga 8 — Saga Foundation—a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to raising awareness and creating models for action to increase nuclear safety and security, 2008 (“Nuclear Terrorism: Local Effects, Global Consequences,” White Paper — Saga Foundation, July, Available Online at http://www.sagafoundation.org/SagaFoundationWhitePaperSAGAMARK7282008.pdf, Accessed 07-20-2013, p. 1-2)

Nuclear terrorism represents the most serious existential threat to the security of the United States and the world. Yet the issue has all but disappeared from view. A number of reasons underlie the lack of discussion of nuclear terrorism in the 2008 presidential campaign. It may be it has yet to draw focused attention because of the absence of any further terror attacks on the U.S. homeland since 9/11. It may be due to a belief in some quarters that a nuclear act of terrorism is a remote possibility because of the inherent difficulty of surreptitiously assembling or acquiring a nuclear weapon. And it may be that since we agree it’s a serious problem, what is there to argue about, the assumption being we must be doing everything possible to prevent it. During the 2004 presidential campaign, both President Bush and Senator John Kerry said that nuclear terrorism was the leading threat to national security. Little has changed since, except that the public’s focus has turned elsewhere. This lack of controversy is a pronounced obstacle confronting those seeking to energize the issue. Just about everyone agrees: an act of nuclear terror would be a terrible thing; it would devastate the community attacked and psychologically terrorize the rest of the nation. But there has been relatively little public and media [end page 1] attention to this threat – a threat that could profoundly and permanently change our way of life.

The basic features of a nuclear terrorist attack are so self-evident that very little time and energy has been put into understanding just how terrible such an attack would be. Much good work has been done, but much more needs to be done in this area to ensure that the public understands the stakes involved in the effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. Understanding the dynamics of both an act of nuclear terrorism and its likely aftermath drives home the conclusion that a nuclear terrorist attack anywhere will affect everyone everywhere. In this report, the Saga Foundation seeks to redress the shortcomings in the dialogue about nuclear terrorism and consider in some detail the possible consequences and aftershocks – physical, psychological, economic – that would flow from the detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city. A better understanding of these likely consequences, we believe, will help energize the political community, from the grass roots to our national leaders, to take the steps necessary to seriously and comprehensively address this threat. While Saga strongly advocates further research, including comprehensive war-game exercises into the dynamics of a nuclear terrorist attack, our analysis and research already in existence enable us to reach a basic understanding of the widespread impact of an attack in a single location.

#### SOLVENCY

#### Now is the *key time* for constructive engagement — the plan establishes a new paradigm for U.S.-Cuba relations.

Piccone 13 — Ted Piccone, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, served eight years as a senior foreign policy advisor in the Clinton Administration, holds a J.D. from Columbia University, 2013 (“Time to Bet on Cuba,” *The Hill*, March 18th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/03/18-cuba-piccone, Accessed 05-20-2013)

Cuba’s efforts to “update” its socialist system through a series of economic reforms just got more complicated. The death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, its principal benefactor, could seriously disrupt what is already a precarious process of maintaining top-down political control while liberalizing elements of the economy. Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will step down in five years and the emergence of younger leaders born after the 1959 revolution add further uncertainty to the island’s future.

These new circumstances offer President Obama a rare opportunity to turn the page of history from an outdated Cold War approach to Cuba to a new era of constructive engagement. In his second term in office, he should place a big bet by investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that will advance U.S. interests in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba.

Under Castro, the Cuban government has undertaken important reforms to modernize and liberalize the economy. Cubans are now permitted to buy and sell property, open their own businesses, hire employees and enter into co-ops, with state-owned enterprises on a more equal footing. The updating of the Soviet-style economic system is a gradual and highly controlled process. But the recent legal emergence of formal, small-scale private businesses (cuentapropistas) that can now compete on a more equal footing with state-owned enterprises opens a window into a profound shift in thinking already under way on the island. The reforms also offer new opportunities for U.S. engagement.

Castro’s loosening of the apron strings extends beyond the economy. In January, the Cuban government lifted exit controls for most citizens, which is likely to accelerate the process of reconciliation within the Cuban diaspora. It could also result in a swift uptick of Cubans departing for the United States, demanding a reconsideration of U.S. migration policy to manage the increase. The gradual handoff of power to a next generation of more pragmatic party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process is yet further evidence that the Castro generation is looking forward to securing a viable legacy.

The U.S. approach to Cuba has likewise undergone important changes since Obama took office. Since the expansion of travel and remittances in 2009, hundreds of thousands of the 1.8 million Cuban Americans living in the United States have sent more than $2 billion to relatives there, providing important fuel to the burgeoning private sector and empowering citizens to be less dependent on the Cuban state.

Much more, however, could be done. In his second term, Obama has a wealth of policy options available to him through executive authority that would reframe U.S. support for the Cuban people and advance U.S. national interests.

In his second term, the president can (and should):

* Appoint a special envoy to open a discrete dialogue with Havana without preconditions to discuss such issues as migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, energy and the environment, and trade and investment. Such talks could result in provisions that strengthen border security, protect Florida from oil spills, break down the walls of communication that prevent our diplomats from traveling outside Havana and help U.S. businesses export more goods, and thereby create jobs.
* Authorize financial and technical assistance to support burgeoning small businesses and permit trade in goods and services with certified independent entrepreneurs.
* Expand the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including school and art supplies, water and food preparation systems and telecommunications equipment.
* Grant general licenses for journalists, researchers, humanitarian organizations and others to facilitate people-to-people exchanges.
* Remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it does not belong, allowing a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce.

This list is not exhaustive; the president can take any number of unilateral steps to improve relations and increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. He can also expect significant pushback from a well-organized and vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step with their constituencies on this issue. (In the 2012 election, Obama’s share of the Cuban-American vote increased by 10 points in Miami-Dade county.) He can win the argument, however, by demonstrating that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous Cuba.

The trend toward reform in Cuba is evident and suggests that an inflection point is approaching. Now is the time to employ a new paradigm by opening a long overdue direct dialogue with our next-door neighbor and thereby test the willingness of the Cuban government to engage constructively, including on the case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross. By invoking his executive authority to expand trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people, Obama can continue to help them make the transition from subjects to citizens. The moment has come to rise above historical grievances and extend that outstretched hand he so eloquently promised just four years ago.

#### Unconditional engagement is key —

Huddleston and Pascual 10 — Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition, served in a variety of diplomatic roles including Ambassador to Madagascar and Mali, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, Chief U.S. diplomat in Cuba from 1999 to 2002, and Deputy Chief of Mission in Port au Prince, Haiti during the deployment of the Multinational Forces in 1994-95, recipient of the Distinguished Honor Award and Presidential Meritorious Service Award from the U.S. Department of State, holds an M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, served in a variety of diplomatic roles including Ambassador to Ukraine and Mexico, holds a Master of Public Policy degree from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2010 (“Introduction,” *Learning to Salsa: New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations*, Published by Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 9780815704324, p. 10)

This book’s recommendation of a proactive, unilateral policy is predicated on an assessment that it is in the interest of the United States to seek ways to set both countries on a path that leads them out of the stalemate in bilateral relations. While the United States ultimately hopes to see consistent and irreversible political and economic openings on the island, to prescribe these objectives as preconditions for engagement is folly as it boils down to a reactive stance in which Cuban inaction determines U.S. action—or inaction. Indeed, inaction is in the short-term interest of a Cuban government focused on preserving power. And since the Cuban government will not pursue any reciprocal conditions established on paper, the United States should make clear the direction of policy it wishes to take, and decide when it wishes to take those steps. The United States would assess and judge Cuban actions that are fundamental to the conduct of foreign policy. On the basis of these unilateral judgments, the United States should decide on measures that will advance U.S. policy without making itself hostage to Cuban resistance to U.S. benchmarks.